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ABSTRACT
Today’s military focus has moved away from the
force-on-force battlefield of the past century and
into the domain of irregular warfare and its companion security, stability, transition and reconstruction missions. With that change in focus has
come a need to examine the operational environment from a far wider perspective, one that
includes the whole range of human experiences
and circumstances. As the set of factors and list
of players expands, the need for reliable modeling and simulation increases, if for no other reason than to help the human decision maker make
sense of this expanded decision space. However,
to do this, the models and simulations must take
into account the “whole of government,” “whole
of society,” and all those with an interest in region in question – allies, trade partners, adversaries, individuals, and networks of influence. The
ideal solution would be to inject models from the
human sciences into our kinetic simulations and
declare success, but this is not possible. The different disciplines that comprise social and human
sciences have different vocabularies and interpretations of events. They understand measurement,
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data, and models in diverse ways and their time
scales vary from those we understand from working with kinetic models. The intent of this paper
is to examine some of these differences and the
challenges they present both technically and managerially.
1

INTRODUCTION

Within the military and across other application
domains, models and simulations are used to
support a variety of important activities including
training, decision making at various levels, and
understanding the interplay of options in a complex environment. The requirement for such
models is that they reflect – to the extent needed
for the specific application – the actors and the
environmental factors that influence their actions. This requirement is easily stated but not as
readily implemented as the complexity of the environment in which the actions take place increases, particularly when that complexity involves the full range of human, social, cultural
and behavioral factors.
When irregular warfare missions are involved, avoiding the human element invites failure. The need to include the human element has
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been recognized and documented in US military
warfighting concepts:
Irregular warfare depends not just on our military
prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks,
religious influences and cultural mores. People,
not platforms and advanced technology, will be
the key to irregular warfare success. The joint
force will need to be patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships
and partnerships essential to executing irregular
warfare. [IWJOC, 2007]

This concept of irregular warfare as an engagement, building relationships and partnerships, is consistent with the understanding that
the military mission is a part of an overall national security policy that involves all pillars of
national power – diplomacy, information, military and economic (DIME).
The NATO Code of Best Practice for Command and Control (C2) assessment, written in
support of analyzing operations other than war,
observed that military forces are used increasingly as an integrated part of overarching political
operations [NATO, 2002]. If this is the case, and
the need involves modeling the outcome of the
overall operation, what were formerly purely
military simulations must now incorporate
“whole of government” and “whole of society”
roles, factors, and environments. Thus the requirement to model actors and the environmental
factors that influence their behavior becomes
significantly more difficult.
Military simulations to date have relied on
the familiar areas of attrition, maneuver, weaponry, and battle damage in environments that,
while complex, were largely governed by physical laws readily cast into mathematical relationships. Interactions among systems were difficult,
but the relationships governing them were reasonably well known and computable. The data to
support the models had been collected over many
years using field and laboratory experiments.
While the “end-to-end” system of interactions in
a complicated joint land, air, and sea battle still
required some level of assessment by subject
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matter experts, these experts could rely on having experienced the same type of scenario in the
course of their military careers.
The universe changes when the human domain becomes a driving factor in the simulation.
Social sciences have also used various types of
models, but the nature and basis of the models
are different across the various social science
disciplines and from the physical models of traditional military simulation. The data to support
social science models comes from different
sources, and its collection is often complicated in
ways unknown to physical scientists. Laboratory
experiments are made difficult by timelines, often generational, and the problem of holding variables constant. It may take years for a social
change to take place; during that time the world
may change in ways that cannot be controlled by
an experiment. Social science experiments give
physical scientists headaches. All these challenges must be understood, met, and addressed
before the human sciences can become full partners in military simulation. Just enumerating the
relevant human factors and the disciplines that
study them strikes fear into the heart of the simulation community – or should. Fig. 1 (next page)
illustrates the factors that form and govern the
human actor.
The technical complexity spawns managerial
difficulties. Advancing our ability to model the
full range of military problems, including the militarily relevant aspects of human behavior, requires approaches that bridge managerial as well
as technical problems.
The first problem is a lack of common vocabulary among the physical scientists, social
scientists, and user communities. This observation has been made by NATO and in the United
States by Joint Forces Command and by participants when conferences and workshops have
brought these communities into direct contact.
The presence of so many different academic disciplines in Fig. 1 is testimony to the fact that cultural (and lexical) divisions separate the groups
engaged in the study of the human domain.
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Figure 1. Factors involved in human decision making and their formal academic disciplines

The next problem is that the management
structure in military simulation, including the
groups that fund the development of new models,
is dominated by physical scientists – those very
people who get headaches whenever they are
confronted with the issues and methods of the
human sciences. When their comfort zone is the
physical sciences, it is difficult for resource
sponsors to place their trust in the results of social science research, experimentation, and modeling. This is compounded by the fact that social
science models do not yield to traditional approaches for validation, verification, and accreditation. Fig. 2 shows some modeling approaches
arranged along a scale with engineering models

right. The comfort zone of the defense modeling
establishment is solidly on the left while the
models most useful in many social and human
contexts fall to the right. The MINERVA program was initiated to open dialog between the
military and the social science community without requiring that the research be sponsored under the defense establishment. It is one of a number of efforts on the part of the military research
community to engage social scientists and take
advantage of their expertise in solving the new
and difficult problems that face the defense
community.
Finally, nobody wants to be responsible for
data. Everyone needs data, but the prospect of
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Figure 2. Modeling domain (engineering models on the left, social science models on the right).

on the left and heuristics-based modeling on the
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having to be the collection, storage, and dissemi-
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nation agent for the data are daunting, particularly since there are no universally accepted taxonomies or metadata standards upon which to rely when working across social science
disciplines.
2

A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR SOCIAL
SCIENCE MODELING

In response to the changes in military missions
and their implication for research in modeling,
the US Air Force requested the National Research Council (NRC) to review the state of the
art in modeling the behavior of humans as individuals and in groups of various sizes (the larger
social context). The application areas included
the development of doctrine, strategies, and tactics for dealing with both state and non-state adversaries; the analysis of current political and
military situations for planning and future operations; and the development of models and simulations for training and mission rehearsal. Once
gaps had been identified, the NRC study panel
was asked to develop a research roadmap for filling those gaps.
The study [Zacharias, 2008] organized its
conclusions in five major categories:
1.

Modeling strategy—matching the problem to the
real world: Difficulties in this area are created either by inattention to the real world being modeled or by unrealistic expectations about how
much of the world can be modeled and how close
a match between model and world is feasible.

2.

Verification, validation, and accreditation: These
important functions often are made more difficult
by expectations that verification, validation, and
accreditation (VV&A)—as it has been defined for
the validation of models of physical systems—can
be usefully applied to IOS (individual, organizational, societal) models.

3.

Modeling tactics—designing the internal structure
of a model: Problems are sometimes generated by
unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the
social, organizational, cultural, and individual
behavior domains, and sometimes by a failure to
deliberately and thoughtfully match the scope of
the model to the scope of the phenomena to be
modeled.
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4.

Differences between modeling physical phenomena and human behavior—dealing with uncertainty
and adaptation: Problems arise from unrealistic
expectations of how much uncertainty reduction is
plausible in modeling human and organizational
behavior, as well as on poor choices in handling
the changing nature of human structures and
processes.

5.

Combining components and federating models:
Problems arise from the way in which linkages
within and across levels of analysis change the
nature of system operation. They occur when
creating multilevel models and when linking together more specialized models of behavior into a
federation of models.

The study regarded the modeling of human behavior as an emerging science and acknowledged
the many disciplines from which it had drawn. It
also acknowledged that to provide a robust scientific foundation for such modeling, researchers
from different domains needed a common
framework for expressing concepts and forums
in which to compare, discuss, and evaluate their
findings and results.
The study’s recommendations included the following:
1. Sponsor an integrated, cross-disciplinary
research program that would include the
development of theory; the ability to
model uncertainty, dynamic adaptability,
and rational (or irrational) behavior; methodologies for the collection of data, particularly in denied or dangerous areas; the
ability to federate models and understanding of when such federation is appropriate; ways of validating and assessing the
utility of models; and development of
tools and infrastructure for enabling model building.
2. Incentivize multidisciplinary conferences
and workshops to assist social science
model developers in understanding the
nature of military decision making, and to
help military sponsors and users to realize
the nature and applicability of social
science models.
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3. Develop a roadmap for future research
and development based on a dialog between the scientist and the user, and focused on a series of challenge problems
with clear specifications for the uses of
the model together with well-defined military needs.
The recognition of the need to couple the research to demanding user needs as a way of engaging the military community is a critical insight, one that is also important in scaling the
problem down to tractable size.
3

CRITICALITY OF HAVING USER
NEEDS SPECIFIED

Unless there is a significant effort made to engage the military user in determining what
should be modeled, the modeling community
will be condemned to try to model everything –
an impossibility. Not all facets of human existence are militarily relevant; however, only a
concerted effort at defining mission-oriented
needs can provide the appropriate framework for
modelers. While some missions require highly
detailed data a the local level, for example, data
about needs and interests of a village, not all applications need this type and resolution of data.
Thus it is important both to modeling and data
collection to understand the questions that have
to be addressed for different military missions.
A few simple illustrative examples show the
different types of models and data sets that service specific missions. Consider the problem of a
regional combatant commander who is responsible for the security of the area of the world that is
his domain. One of the most critical factors for
him is to anticipate when a fragile state is likely
to erupt into violence. Generally stability assessments rely on large sets of statistical data and
a few clusters of factors that appear to be leading
indicators of problems. There is no need to have
a detailed understanding of tribal customs, for
example, to evaluate the likelihood of violence
breaking out. An ongoing research program
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sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency [DARPA, 2009] is developing a
set of linked tools for addressing this type of application.
If you are a military commander engaged in a
reconstruction operation, you may need to assess
the success of your projects in achieving the
overall goal of returning the governance and welfare of the country to its own government. In this
case, the model must describe the principal factors that determine stability in a country, factors
that contribute to or detract from stability. Such a
model has already been developed collaboratively by the Department of Defense, State Department, and US Agency for International Development; it is based on assessing the following
factors: political moderation, a safe and secure
environment, the rule of law, a sustainable economy, and social well-being [Dziedzic, 2008].
There are both objective and subjective components of each of these factors; therefore, the data
collected to evaluate performance have to include both concrete evidence of performance and
perception of performance.
While stability is an issue for both the regional combatant commander and for the military commander in charge of reconstruction, the
models and data vary with the specific mission
and the questions arising from that mission. A
completely different approach is needed for the
commander who must work in a region where
hostilities are active and security is at issue. The
forward based commander, like the commander
in Khost or Helmand in Afghanistan, needs to
understand the population at a much more refined level. A taxonomy for state and non-state
actors including their interests, capabilities, operational context and decision-making styles, could
direct the military user toward the information he
must collect to begin to understand the dynamics
of his environment [Numrich, 2008]. Using such
data, agent-based models might then be used to
explore possible futures or the potential success
of courses of action [Chaturvedi, 2005; Silverman, 2006 a, b].
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Consider a different problem – tracking global terrorist movements and determining which of
the many groups might be contemplating the use
of weapons of mass destruction. As a global
problem with security implications, this becomes
a military mission. With limited resources, the
hundreds of terrorist groups cannot all be watched with the same intensity. To make this problem
tractable, the military user must determine a subset of groups that is more likely than the others to
be able to acquire and use such weapons. Taking
the Bayesian view that past performance is an
indicator of future action, modelers have used
regression analyses to compare key parameters
of terrorist groups and identify correlations and
similarities, thereby reducing a list of hundreds
to the top twenty or thirty [Asal, 2008]. The data
useful in this analysis are incident data extracted
from unformatted textual accounts of incidences
of violence.
Breaking out the complexity of human, social, cultural, and behavioral modeling through a
careful examination of mission needs is a practical way of understanding the data and modeling
requirements. While it is certainly possible to incorporate social science modeling into military
applications without first understanding the mission needs, the NATO Code of Best Practices
[NATO, 2002] would argue against such an approach. The Code places emphasis on problem
formulation as fundamental to any analysis, especially when the problems are ill-defined and
complex, and involve many dimensions with a
rich context. There is much wisdom in specifying
a problem with care before attempting a solution,
but time and resource constraints get in the way
of wisdom.
4

A WORD ABOUT DATA AND MODELS

The examples above allude to an interplay between data and models that is significantly different from what has been observed in physicsbased modeling. Some modeling approaches
make extensive use of statistical data, a form of
data that we consider to be objective or “hard”
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data. In other cases, the issue and hence the model requires soft or subjective (perceptual) data.
Often the combination of both types of data are
required.
For example, if the issue is whether a population is likely to react negatively to a situation, the
critical factor may be the difference between the
actual situation and the people’s perception of it.
The statistical values alone do not tell the story.
Suppose the issue is the availability of reliable
electrical power, and the statistical data indicates
that reliable power is available four hours a day,
seven days a week. In West Africa, having four
hours of reliable power every day may be close
to a miracle, but in Atlantic City, New Jersey,
this degree of deprivation could well cause riots
in the streets. In many human circumstances, the
issue is not the reality but the difference between
the expectation and the reality – an interplay between the objective and subjective data.
But where do the data come from, how easy is it
to get, and how reliable is it? One might hope
that statistical data are readily available and reliable; however, that is not always the case, and
particularly for developing nations that are
among the most likely to be fragile and on the
verge of state failure. Statistical variables are not
always interpreted uniformly, nor are they computed in a standard way. The United Nations is
currently engaged in a multi-year program to
standardize the interpretation and computation of
statistical data across its member nations. However, even in cases where the interpretation and
computation are not in question, frequently there
are gaps in the availability or currency of the data. Data at the provincial and district levels are
absent entirely for the majority of developing nations. In countries without a solid resource base
or where security issues impede collection of data, statistical tables may be a decade or more out
of date. For some countries, even the most basic
demographic data may be lacking. For example,
in Sudan, the last census was taken more than ten
years ago, and the interim migrations, caused by
war and drought, have changed the population
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densities in both the eastern and western frontiers.
Statistical tables are not the only hard data that
are important in social science modeling. The
characterization of terrorist groups done by Asal
and Rethemeyer [Asal, 2008] relies on event data. No agency or entity is currently tasked with
recording all incidents of violence. Extensive
work has been done to extract that information
from numerous sources, most often press releases. Such sources do not come coded in database
format but rather exist in plain text with a somewhat-haphazard handling of details such as time,
location, and lethality. To create a reliable event
database, a dedicated research group must first
create a code book – a list of all the desired variables and a description of how the variable is to
be interpreted. The code book and the media articles are then given to research assistants who
extract the variables from the information in the
articles. Their work is carefully checked by a verifier and then entered into the database. Most
individual sources will not contain the full set of
variables sought, resulting in gaps in the data. In
addition, sources must be compared carefully to
make sure that multiple reports of the same incident are handled properly. This is a manual
process; attempts to automate it have been met
with only limited success.
The common sources for perceptual or subjective
data are structured polls, discussions with subject
matter experts, or extraction of information from
media sources (press releases, information published on web sites, audio and video clips). Accurate polling data are hard to acquire, particularly when crossing cultural and linguistic barriers
that tend to blur meaning. Eliciting the desired
information frequently requires breaking the direct questions suitable for American audiences
into clusters of related but culturally appropriate
concepts. Professional polling groups earn their
reputations by producing statistically consistent,
culturally adjusted polls that are repeated at least
annually to permit the construction of trend lines.
When professional polls are not available, casual
surveys can provide useful information; howev-
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er, the results can be suspect on technical
grounds including selection of the sampled population, nature of the questions and the manner in
which the survey is administered.
Subject matter experts are important sources of
information and their perspectives on a situation
can add critical insight. However, the same experiences and training that contribute to their expertise can also create a bias in their perceptions.
Since choosing the “right” subject matter expert
is extremely difficult, the safest approach to using subject matter experts is to use a wide
enough variety to minimize the impact of relying
on any single point of view or bias.
Media extraction presents a very different set of
issues. All media articles are biased in some way.
The editorial policy of the newspaper or the
perspective of the reporter may be the source of
bias. In nations where the press is both monitored
and controlled, the media will publish what the
government wants. Translations can be biased
based on the skill of the translator. Automation
has been used to speed the extraction of data
from texts. Some types of extraction rely on
word matching and statistical analyses, and are
referred to as “bag of words” approaches. Other
methods use natural language processing to extract a more nuanced meaning; however, these
methods are hard to apply beyond the English
language. This is particularly unfortunate since
the most reliable reporting is done in the vernacular.
Data acquisition for social science models is not
easy, and there are normally gaps in the available
data. A careful analysis based on mission needs
can help focus data acquisition on militarily relevant information and avoid expending scarce resources on creating overly large taxonomies, data
bases and metadata standards.
5

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST (COI)

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recognized the
need for locating and linking a network of experts who could explore effective methods for
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applying social science models to irregular warfare problems [Garrett, 2009]. This effort capitalized on the prior work done under NATO in
building a framework for collaboration. To identify initial group membership, the research group
supporting COI created a questionnaire to identify and catalog the knowledge of experts. Initially, the structure of the NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment guided the categorization.
Experts in human and social sciences have improved this structure to reflect a better characterization of their disciplines. The catalog was implemented using a global visualization tool, “The
Brain,” instead of traditional databases. The
Brain supported not only the immediate visualization of the COI, it also showed where gaps existed, and where overlapping functionality resided. Experts and military practitioners were
encouraged to enter a collaborative environment
through which they could share ideas and work
with the Brain. Every effort was made to create a
welcoming virtual environment for all researchers, not only those who would normally work
with the military.
A number of problems are associated with
the formation of communities of interest, at least
two of which are critical and involve resourcing.
The first problem involves creating an incentive
for individuals to participate regularly; the
second, providing sustainment of the COI over
time. While nearly all groups and individuals involved with the application of human sciences to
military modeling agree that cross-disciplinary
engagement of experts and users is essential to
breaking down the language barriers and creating
an environment of mutual understanding, nobody
has yet solved the problem of incentivizing busy
people to spend part of their limited time engaged in a COI. While JFCOM was able to
create a novel and effective environment for the
COI, their effort was in the nature of an experiment; to date, no entity has been willing or able
to resource the sustainment of the COI.
While these issues are not peculiar to social
science modeling, the inability to solve them has
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a greater negative impact on a field that is struggling to establish itself.
6

FINDING A WAY FORWARD

For those who feared that the modeling and simulation (M&S) community had solved the hard
problems and was destined to a future of limited
improvements, the need to incorporate the human
dimension – the “whole of government” and
“whole of society” factors into military simulation – has created myriad challenges. The demands for social science modeling, or the results
thereof, have now been heard and resources are
being brought to bear on addressing the attendant
problems. The lessons learned in working with
kinetic models and simulations must be carried
forward, but new challenges requiring new approaches have arrived with the introduction of
new disciplines. From model design to validation, technical and managerial processes must be
rethought to accommodate the theories and methods of the social sciences. Data acquisition
takes on new dimensions with the need to blend
objective and subjective data. Both incentivizing
and sustainment will present problems as the
field of social science modeling attempts to find
its footing in military applications. With challenges come opportunities. While the field is in
its early stages, the M&S community would be
wise to engage across the user and expert communities to define clear mission-driven needs as
suggested by the National Research Council.
Time and resources expended to specify the
problems clearly and create meaningful conversations between the military users and experts in
social science modeling will save time and resources as we strive to meet the challenges of
human, social, cultural, and behavior modeling
for military missions.
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